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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze the ability of monetary policy to stabilize both the macroeconomy and
nancial markets under two di¤erent scenarios: xed and variable-rate mortgages. I develop and
solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) that features a housing
market and a group of constrained individuals who need housing collateral to obtain loans. A given
share of constrained households borrows at a variable rate, while the rest borrow at a xed rate.
I consider two alternative ways of introducing a macroprudential approach to enhancing nancial
stability: one in which monetary policy, using the interest rate as an instrument, responds to credit
growth; and a second one in which the macroprudential instrument is instead the loan-to-value ratio
(LTV). The results show that when rates are variable, a countercyclical LTV rule performs better
in stabilizing nancial markets than monetary policy. However, when rates are xed, even though
monetary policy is less e¤ective in stabilizing the macroeconomy, it does a good job in promoting
nancial stability.
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"The explicit incorporation of macroprudential considerations in the nations framework for nancial
oversight represents a major innovation in our thinking about nancial regulation [:::] This new direc-
tion is constructive and necessary, I believe, but it also poses considerable conceptual and operational
challenges in its implementation." Ben Bernanke, May 5, 2011.
1 Introduction
In recent years, especially during the period of the Great Moderation, monetary policy was seen as a
very powerful tool for stabilizing the economy. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, new experiences
have revealed that this statement is not true for all cases nor in all circumstances. First of all, the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy may depend on structural factors in the economy. In particular, there
may be institutional features, especially in housing markets, that are country specic and that may a¤ect
the optimal conduct of policies. One source of heterogeneity, which can be crucial, is the structure of
mortgage contracts. Mortgage contracts in an economy can involve either a xed or variable rate, and
the proportion of each type of mortgage varies from country to country. The link between the policy
rate and xed rates is weaker, because the latter are more connected to longer-term rates, and thus, in
this case, monetary policy is less e¤ective.1 On the other hand, with the crisis, policy and academic
discussions have focused on how to ensure a more stable nancial system: a macroprudential approach
to prevent situations in which problems in the nancial sector are transmitted to the real sectors of the
economy and vice versa. It is debatable whether monetary policy alone can achieve this goal; it may
need the help of other tools that help avoid excessive credit growth. The following question remains.
Does the mortgage structure of the economy a¤ect the ability of monetary policy to enhance nancial
stability?
In this paper, I try to shed some light on this issue. I analyze the ability of monetary policy
to stabilize nancial markets under two di¤erent scenarios: when the prevalent mortgage rate in the
economy is variable and when it is xed. Recent literature shows that the e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy in stabilizing the macroeconomy is reduced when rates are xed. Nevertheless, the literature is
silent about whether this feature has an impact on the potential of monetary policy to promote nancial
stability.
There is evidence of di¤erent cross-country mortgage contracts. While xed-rate mortgages predom-
1See Rubio (2011) or Brzoza-Brzezina (2014) for theoretical models that show that xed-rate contracts imply less e¤ective
monetary policy.
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inate in the US, the majority of consumers borrow at a variable rate in Canada and Australia. Within
European countries, we have striking di¤erences such that the vast majority of consumers in the United
Kingdom and Spain have variable-rate mortgages, as opposed to Germany and France where most mort-
gage rates are xed (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Rubio (2011) and Calza et al. (2013) show that
the structure of mortgage contracts has important implications for the transmission of monetary policy
in the sense that policy rate changes are less e¤ective when the mortgage rate is xed. However, these
papers do not touch upon the issue of whether having xed- or variable-rate mortgages may also a¤ect
nancial stability and the optimal design of macroprudential policies.
In this paper, I build a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing,
collateral constraints, and xed- and variable-rate mortgages to study how the mortgage structure in an
economy a¤ects the optimal design of both monetary and macroprudential policies. In the model, there
are three types of consumers: savers, variable-rate borrowers and xed-rate borrowers. Borrowers need
collateral in order to access credit markets, which are more or less tight depending on the loan-to-value
ratio (LTV). Monetary policy is conducted by the central bank. For the macroprudential policies, I
consider two options: one where they are conducted by the central bank with the interest rate as the
instrument, and a second one in which there is a macroprudential regulator that uses a countercyclical
rule for the LTV as a macroprudential tool.
As this is a microfounded model, it is appropriate to study welfare-related issues. In this setting, there
are several channels that a¤ect welfare and that are dependent on mortgage contracts. In new Keynesian
models with collateral constraints, there are two types of distortions: sticky prices and credit frictions.
Savers prefer policies that alleviate the rst distortion, because they own the rms. They are better
o¤ in a scenario with price stability, the goal of monetary policy. On the contrary, borrowerswelfare
increases when the credit friction distortion is minimized. Then, borrowers may prefer situations that
generate ination or policies that enhance nancial stability, namely macroprudential ones. However,
these mechanisms may di¤er depending on whether the prevalent mortgage contract in the economy is
a xed or variable rate. In the variable-rate scenario, monetary policy is more stabilizing because there
is a one-for-one link between the policy rate and the borrowing rate. With respect to macroprudential
policies, their e¤ectiveness will also depend on whether the economy has xed or variable rates, because
their interaction with monetary policy will have an e¤ect on nancial stability.
With the purpose of understanding the dynamics of the baseline model and as a motivation for my
study, as a rst step I present impulse responses to a technology shock, for the case in which there
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are no macroprudential policies. I nd that having variable- or xed-rate mortgages not only a¤ects
the macroeconomic dynamics but also the nancial side of the economy. The xed-rate economy, has
a less powerful monetary policy tool but borrowers are more exposed to changes in ination and house
prices, a¤ecting their nancial capacity. Therefore, the structure of mortgage contracts should have
clear implications, not only for monetary policy reaction but also for macroprudential policies that focus
on nancial stability. Then, it is relevant to study the optimal implementation of both monetary and
macroprudential policies in the context of variable- and xed-rate mortgages.
Then, I analyze how the optimality of monetary and macroprudential policies changes depending
on the mortgage structure of the economy. I dene optimal policy as the one that maximizes total
welfare. As mentioned, I consider two alternative ways of introducing macroprudential policies. First, I
present a simple and automatic rule on the LTV. Following this rule, the LTV would be the instrument
of the macroprudential regulator and would react to credit growth. In this way, if the economy is,
for instance, entering a credit boom, the LTV will be cut, thus restricting credit in the economy and
avoiding excessive credit growth. This rule, which resembles a Taylor rule for monetary policy, serves as
a proxy for the macroprudential instruments that have been used by some institutions.2 Alternatively, I
consider including credit growth in the interest-rate rule of the central bank. In this way, the monetary
authority would have one instrument, the interest rate, to take care of two objectives: macroeconomic
and nancial stability.
The results show that macroprudential policies increase welfare regardless of the mortgage structure
prevalent in the economy. Nevertheless, when mortgages are variable rate, an LTV rule combined with
monetary policy is preferable to including credit variables in the interest-rate rule. When rates are xed,
using the interest rate as an instrument both for monetary and macroprudential policy delivers higher
welfare and stability than having two separate instruments. Interestingly for the xed-rate case, in which
monetary policy is less e¤ective in stabilizing the macroeconomy, it is a more powerful tool for stabilizing
the nancial system. Sticky prices introduce a rst distortion in the economy that can be xed through
monetary policy. However, for the xed rate case, a simple Taylor rule responding to ination and
output is not able to e¤ectively x this rst distortion. The collateral constraint is introducing an extra
distortion that can be xed by making the regulator respond to credit variables. When credit variables
2LTV rules have become particularly popular. See for instance, Gruss and Sgherri (2009) who analyze the welfare e¤ects
of procyclical LTVs in a real business cycle model with borrowing constraints. Funke and Paetz (2012) use a nonlinear rule
on the LTV and nd that it can help reduce the transmission of house price cycles to the real economy. In a similar way,
Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral
values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV.
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are introduced in the Taylor rule, it becomes a more powerful tool because of the volatility of credit with
respect to the other two variables and because of the indirect e¤ects that this will have on house prices.
This is indeed an example of a theory of second best, given the distortion that the collateral constraint
is introducing.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. First, it introduces heterogeneity in mortgage
contracts in the spirit of Rubio (2011), Calza et al. (2013) and Garriga et al. (2015). However, those
studies restrict themselves to the e¤ects of the mortgage structure on business cycles and monetary
policy, without analyzing the implications for macroprudential policies. Second, it is close to the recent
macroprudential literature. On the one hand, it relates with papers in which macroprudential policies
interact with monetary policy as in Kannan et al. (2012), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), and
Angelini et al. (2014). However, none of the above mentioned papers examine how xed- and variable-
rate mortgages a¤ect the implementation of macroprudential policies nor a¤ect nancial stability. On the
other hand, my paper also explores whether monetary and macroprudential policies should be conducted
by the same regulator using only one instrument responding to two target variables or two regulators with
two di¤erent instruments. Following the same line, Beau et al. (2012) claim that it is preferable to have
a combination of separate objectives for monetary and macroprudential policies. Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2015) also nd that monetary policy should focus on price stability, while macroprudential
policy should have nancial stability as an instrument. Kannan et al. (2012) experiment with an
augmented Taylor rule and an LTV rule as well and nd that the results depend on the source of the
shock considered. In my paper, I nd that having two separate instruments is preferred in the case of
variable-rate mortgages but the augmented Taylor rule delivers higher welfare when rates are xed.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 explains the basic model I build for the analysis and
its dynamics. Section 3 shows the modeling of the macroprudential policies. Section 4 analyzes the
normative implications of introducing macroprudential policies and displays the optimal monetary and
macroprudential policy mix. Section 5 presents the conclusions. The Appendix contains tables on the
empirical evidence mentioned above, sensitivity analyses, extra graphs and model derivations.
2 The Baseline Model
I consider an innite-horizon economy in which households consume, work and demand real estate. There
is a representative nancial intermediary that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers.
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Firms set prices subject to Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996) nominal rigidity. The monetary authority sets
interest rates endogenously, in response to ination and output, following a Taylor rule.
2.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers who borrow at
a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. Constrained individuals need
to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the nancial intermediary. Interest
payments for both mortgages and loans cannot exceed a proportion of the future value of the current
house stock. In this way, the nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to
fulll their debt obligations next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), I assume that constrained consumers
are more impatient than unconstrained ones. This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is
binding, so that constrained individuals do not save and wait until they have the funds to self-nance
their consumption. This generates an economy in which households divide into borrowers and savers.
Furthermore, borrowers are split into two groups: those who borrow at a xed rate and those who borrow
at a variable rate. The proportion of each type of borrower is xed and exogenous. All households derive
utility from consumption, and housing services are assumed proportional to the housing stock and leisure.
2.1.1 The Financial Intermediary
Consider a nancial intermediary that accepts deposits from savers, and extends both xed- and variable-
rate loans to borrowers.3 I assume a competitive framework, and thus the intermediary takes the
variable-interest rate as given. The prots of the nancial intermediary are dened as:
Ft = Rt 1bcvt 1 + (1  )Rt 1bcft 1  Rt 1but 1; (1)
where Ft represents the prots of the nancial intermediary,  is the proportion of variable rates, Rt 1
is the gross policy rate set by the central bank, and bcvt 1 and b
cf
t 1 are one-period variable- and xed-rate
mortgages, respectively.4 but 1 represent deposits.
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowings and savings must be equal, that is:
3 In countries where xed-rate mortgages are most extensively used, nancial intermediaries pass on the loans to investors
with long-term liabilities (such as pension funds and life-insurance companies). Short-term deposits are predominantly used
to nance mortgages in countries where variable-rate mortgages are commonly used. These institutional features are beyond
the scope of this paper.
4Note that in this model mortgages are a ow variable.
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bcvt + (1  ) bcft = but : (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we obtain:
Ft = (1  ) bcft 1
 
Rt 1  Rt 1

. (3)
In order for the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed interest rate has to be such that the
intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate.5 Hence, the expected discounted
prots that the intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a xed interest rate must
be equal to the expected discounted prots the intermediary would obtain by lending it at a variable
rate:6
E
1X
i=+1
i ;iR

 = E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRi 1; (4)
where t;i =

Cut
Cut+i

is the unconstrained consumer-relevant discount factor. As the nancial interme-
diary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the nancial intermediarys
problem.7 Note that, as stated previously, variable-rate debt is one period but the portion of new debt
acquired at a xed rate is associated with a long-term contract.8 As the agent is innitely lived, the
nancial intermediary considers an innitely lasting maturity in these calculations.9
We can obtain the equilibrium value of the xed rate in period  from expression (4):
R

 =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRi 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
. (5)
Equation (5) states that, for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed interest rate
5The steady-state xed rate equals the steady-state variable rate and therefore the steady state of the model is not
a¤ected by this specication.
6The xed-rate loan is priced following this nonarbitrage condition, not by applying the prices of zero-coupon bonds to
the future cash ows from the new loan.
7Note that there is no di¤erence between having the nancial intermediary as a separate agent or putting these decisions
with the patient household.
8The long-term contract relates primarily to the interest rate, rather than the debt being explicitly amortized.
9Calza et al. (2010) also develop a model in which the nancial intermediary o¤ers xed- and variable-rate mortgages.
However, in their model, the two types of mortgages do not coexist. For them, the xed-rate loan is a two-period contract,
whereas the variable-rate loan is for one period. In my model, I allow for the two mortgages to be o¤ered in order to be
able to study intermediate cases in which a mix of the two types of contracts are present in the economy.
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that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable interest rates. Note that this is not a
condition on the stock of debt, but on the new amount obtained in a given period. New debt at a given
point in time is associated with a di¤erent xed interest rate. Both the xed interest rate in period 
and the new amount of debt in period  are xed for all future periods. However, the xed interest
rate varies with the date the debt was issued, so that in every period there is a new xed interest rate
associated with new debt in this period. If we consider xed-rate loans to be long term, the nancial
intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of debt, not only from the new
debt. Hence, we can dene the aggregate xed interest rate as being the one the nancial intermediary
e¤ectively charges every period for the whole stock of mortgages. This aggregate xed interest rate is a
function of all past xed interest rates on past debt, together with the current period equilibrium xed
interest rate on the new debt. Therefore, the e¤ective xed interest rate that the nancial intermediary
charges for the stock of xed-rate debt every period is:
Rt =
8><>:
Rt 1bcft 1+R

t

bcft  bcft 1

bcft
if bcft > b
cf
t 1
Rt 1 if b
cf
t  bcft 1
9>=>; . (6)
Equation (6) states that the xed interest rate that the nancial intermediary is actually charging today
is an average of what it charged last period for the previous stock of mortgages and what it charges
this period for the new amount.10 In the case that there is no new debt, the xed interest rate will be
equal to last periods.11 Then, in the same way that variable rates are revised every period, xed rates
are revised by including the new optimal xed interest rate for the new debt originated in this period.
Importantly, this assumption is not crucial for the results. Both R

 and Rt are practically una¤ected
by interest rate shocks.12 This assumption is a way to make the model compatible with the fact that
xed-rate loans are not one-period assets but are longer-term ones.13 Therefore, even though strictly
speaking all mortgages are one-period loans in this model, equation (6) makes xed-rate loans long-term
ones. In this case, if there is new borrowing, this will add to the existing stock of loans at a new optimal
10This expression can be interpreted in a similar way as in Calza et al. (2010). In their model, the xed rate loan is
repaid in two periods. Here, while the contract is of innite maturity, I also divide payments into two blocks: the new
payments made this period for new loans and the payments for the old loans.
11Note that, if Rt > R

t , remortgaging to a lower R

t is not allowed in the model. The agent cannot repay the most
expensive mortgages rst either.
12When the model is log-linearized, the non-linearity disappears because the xed interest rate does not move from the
steady-state interest rate. Please see the Appendix for details.
13 In the real world, variable-rate mortgages are also long-term loans. That is, both loans are amortized over a long
period of time. The only di¤erence is that the interest payments on adjustable-rate mortgages are variable. In the model,
variable-rate mortgages are modeled as one-period loans.
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xed interest rate. If there is no new debt, the interest rate that is charged for the existing stock does
not change. The contract is set at a specic point in time and lasts for as many periods as there is
no new debt. If there is new debt, a new xed interest rate is calculated and an average interest rate
composed of the past interest rate and this new interest rate will be applied to the whole stock of debt.
This new interest rate will also last for as many periods as there is no new debt.
As noted above, any prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the unconstrained consumers
every period. Even if the nancial intermediary is competitive and prots are expected to be zero, if
there is a shock at a given point in time, the fact that only the variable interest rate is directly a¤ected
can generate nonzero prots.
2.1.2 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers maximize:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + jt lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



, (7)
where the superscript u stands for "unconstrained," E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the
discount factor, and Cut , H
u
t and L
u
t are consumption at t, the stock of housing and hours worked,
respectively; 1= (   1) is the labor supply elasticity,  > 0. jt represents the weight of housing in the
utility function. I assume that log(jt) = log(j) + uJt; where uJt follows an autoregressive process. A
shock to jt represents a shock to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing
demand and therefore can be interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices.
The budget constraint is:
Cut + qtH
u
t + b
u
t  qtHut 1 + wut Lut +
Rt 1but 1
t
+ F vt + S
v
t ; (8)
where qt is the real housing price and wut is the real wage for unconstrained consumers who can buy
houses or sell them at the current price qt. I assume zero housing depreciation for simplicity. As we
will see, this group will choose not to borrow at all; they are the savers in this economy. but is the
amount they save. They receive interest Rt 1 for their savings. t is ination in period t. St and Ft are
lump-sum prots received from the rms and the nancial intermediary, respectively. We can think of
these consumers as the wealthy agents in the economy, who own the rms and the nancial intermediary.
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The rst-order conditions for this unconstrained group are:
1
Cut
= Et

Rt
t+1Cut+1

, (9)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1Cut ; (10)
jt
Hut
=
1
Cut
qt   Et 1
Cut+1
qt+1: (11)
Equation (9) is the Euler equation for consumption, equation (10) is the labor-supply condition, and
equation (11) is the Euler equation for housing. This states that the benets from consuming housing
must be equal to the costs at the margin.
2.1.3 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do so at a
xed rate. The di¤erence between them is simply the interest rate they face. The xed-rate borrower
faces Rt, set by the nancial intermediary, whereas the variable-rate counterpart faces Rt, set by the
central bank. The proportion of variable-rate consumers is xed and exogenous and equal to  2 [0; 1].14
Constrained and unconstrained consumers are di¤erent in the way they discount the future. Con-
strained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. I assume that constrained consumers
face a limit on the debt they can acquire. The maximum amount they can borrow is proportional to
the value of their collateral, in this case the stock of housing. That is, the debt repayment next period
cannot exceed a proportion of tomorrows value of todays stock of housing:
Et
Rt
t+1
bcvt  ktEtqt+1Hcvt ; (12)
Et
Rt
t+1
bcft  ktEtqt+1Hcft ; (13)
14This proportion is held xed because it is not the aim of this paper to explain how the decision between xed and
variable-rate mortgages is made. Although this proportion can vary in reality, there is evidence that it uctuates around
a constant mean, for long periods of time, which is higher or lower depending on the country. The European Mortgage
Federation (EMF) highlights that cultural di¤erences play an important role for the predominant type of mortgage contract
in a country. They are linked to real estate law, borrowersrisk aversion, funding system or frequency of house moves.Thus,
in this paper, we take these cross-country di¤erences as due to institutional, historical or cultural factors, out of the scope
of this model.
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where (12) represents the collateral constraint for the variable-rate constrained consumer and (13) is the
constraint for the xed-rate one.15 The superscript cv stands for "constrained variable," while cf stands
for "constrained xed." kt represents a proxy for the LTV and, as we will see, it is the instrument of
the macroprudential authority. As we have seen with the problem of the nancial intermediary, Rt is
an aggregate interest rate that contains information on all the past xed interest rates associated with
past debt. Each period, this aggregate interest rate is updated with a new interest rate linked to the
new amount of debt originated in that period.
Without loss of generality, I present the problem for the variable-rate borrower, because the one for
the xed-rate borrower is symmetric. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + jt lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

, (14)
subject to the budget constraint:
Ccvt + qtH
cv
t +
Rt 1bcvt 1
t
 qtHcvt 1 + wcvt Lcvt + bcvt ; (15)
and (12), the collateral constraint.16 Note that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every period and
acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest rate on
variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according to
the policy rate.17 In order to make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetric and analogous to
the existing models with borrowing constraints, I assume the same debt-repayment structure for this
type of borrower. Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the
model more realistic but still tractable, the xed interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will
be applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, I
reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.18
15Garriga et al. (2005) and Alpanda et al. (2014) take a slightly di¤erent approach for their borrowing constraint. This
strand of the literature di¤erentiates the e¤ects of policies that apply only to new lending as opposed to all existing mortgage
debt. The constraint on borrower households is imposed on the ow rather than the stock of household debt, and new
mortgage loans are modeled as xed rate. This feature captures the notion that a signicant share of new mortgage loans in
the real world are adjustable-rate loans, and some xed-rate mortgages are renanced before the end of their amortization
period. With this specication, an increase in debt in this period leads to a tightening of the borrowing constraint next
period as well. However, with full amortization, both borrowing constraints would be equivalent.
16We will see from the rms problem that wcvt = w
cf
t = w
c
t :
17This assumption is consistent with reality, in which variable interest rates are revised very frequently and changed
according to an interest-rate index tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
18Another option would be to have an overlapping generations model in which we are able to keep track of the debt issued
in each period. However, the model would become more complex and less comparable with the standard collateral-constraint
DSGE models such as that described by Iacoviello (2005).
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As noted above, constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, so that e < .
This assumption is crucial for the borrowing constraint to be binding and therefore, for there to be both
borrowers and savers in the economy.
The rst-order conditions for variable-rate constrained consumers are:
1
Ccvt
= eEt Rt
t+1Ccvt+1

+ cvt Rt; (16)
wcvt = (L
cv
t )
 1Ccvt ; (17)
jt
Hcvt
=
1
Ccvt
qt   eEt 1
Ccvt+1
qt+1

  cvt ktEt (qt+1t+1) . (18)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In the case of con-
strained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations (16)
and (18).19 From the Euler equation for the consumption of unconstrained consumers, we know that
R = 1= in the steady state. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for the consumption of
the constrained individuals we have that cv =

   e =Ccv > 0 in the steady state. This means that
the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady state. As we log-linearize the model around
the steady state and assume that uncertainty is low, we can generalize this result to o¤-steady-state
dynamics. Then, the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals borrow the
maximum amount they are allowed to and unconstrained consumers are never in debt.20
Given the borrowing amount implied by (12) at equality, consumption of the variable-rate constrained
individuals can be determined by their ow of funds:
Ccvt = w
cv
t L
cv
t + b
cv
t + qt
 
Hcvt 1  Hcvt
  Rt 1bcvt 1
t
; (19)
and the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
jt
Hcvt
=
1
Ccvt

qt   ktEt (qt+1t+1)
Rt

  eEt 1
Ccvt+1
(1  kt) qt+1

: (20)
19 In the log-linearized versions of the Euler equations for both consumer types, I include a demand shock reecting
exogenous changes in demand. See equations (46) and (47) in the Appendix.
20This is a typical assumption for this type of model. See Appendix C of Iacoviello (2005) for a detailed analysis of when
constraints bind.
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2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to
the production function:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (21)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good rm chooses
Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (22)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (23)
Market clearing for the nal good requires:
Yt = Ct = C
u
t + C
c
t :
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtL
u
t (z)
 Lct (z)
(1 ) ; (24)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. This Cobb-Douglas production
function implies that the labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substi-
tutes. This specication is analytically tractable and allows for closed-form solutions for the steady state
of the model. This assumption can be economically justied by the fact that savers are the managers of
the rms and their wages are higher than those of the borrowers.21 Experimenting with a production
21 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, and therefore more experienced.
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function in which labor hours for both types of consumers are substitutes leads to very similar results in
terms of model dynamics. Under the Cobb-Douglas specication, each household has mass one.  is a
constant that represents the labor-income share of the patient household and Lut are total hours worked
by the patient household. In the alternative specication, one needs to dene the fraction of agents in
the population, assuming that ! is the fraction of savers. Then, !Lut represents the total hours worked
by the patient household. Therefore, both specications are very similar but, while  represents the
economic size of savers, ! would correspond to their absolute size.22
At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (25)
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology.
Labor demand is determined by:
wut =
1
Xt

Yt
Lut
; (26)
wct =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Lct
; (27)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.23
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1  ;2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being
able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0: (28)
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (29)
Using (28) and (29) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking new Keynesian
Phillips curve that relates ination positively to future ination and negatively to the markup. To
22The full derivation of this alternative specication is available upon request.
23Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
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make the behavior of ination more realistic, I have added a lagged ination term in the new Keynesian
Phillips curve (see equation 53 in the Appendix).24
2.3 Aggregate Variables
Given the fraction  of variable-rate borrowers, we can dene aggregates across constrained consumers
as Cct  Ccvt + (1  )Ccft ; Lct  Lcvt + (1  )Lcft ;Hct  Hcvt + (1  )Hcft ; bct  bcvt + (1  ) bcft :
Therefore, the economy-wide aggregates are: Ct  Cut +Cct ; Lt  Lut +L; and Ht  Hut +Hct : In this
model, aggregate supply of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires Ht = H:25
2.4 Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing, to describe the conduct of monetary
policy by the central bank:26
Rt = (Rt 1)
h

(1+)
t (Yt=Yt 1)
y R
i1 
"Rt; (30)
where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia.  and y > 0 measure the
response of interest rates to current ination and output growth, respectively.27 R is the steady-state
value of the interest rate. "Rt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2" .
2.5 Dynamics
2.5.1 Parameter Values
I linearize the equilibrium equations around the steady state. Details are shown in the Appendix. For
calibration, I consider the following parameter values: the discount factor, , is set to 0:99 so that the
annual interest rate is 4% in the steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.
Lawrance (1991) estimates discount factors for poor consumers of between 0:95 and 0:98 at a quarterly
24 I have followed McCallum (2001) for the specication of the Phillips curve.
25This assumption provides an easy way to specify the supply of housing and to have variable prices. A two-sector model
with production of housing would not generate qualitatively di¤erent results.
26This is a realistic policy benchmark for most industrialized countries. A more realistic rule would also include output
but it complicates developing intuition about the workings of the model. Furthermore, the estimation results suggest a
small response to the output gap in the last two decades (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000). Nevertheless, robustness
checks to this specication will be performed.
27 Including deviations of output from the steady state instead of output growth delivers more indeterminacy areas,
especially for the case of xed rates. Thus, in order to compare the cases of xed and variable rates, it is more convenient
to stick to a Taylor rule with a wider determinacy range for both cases, that is, the one containing output growth, because
otherwise, the xed-rate case becomes too restrictive.
15
frequency. The results are not sensitive to di¤erent values within this range.28 This value of e is low
enough to endogenously divide the economy into borrowers and savers. The weight of housing in the
utility function, j, is set to 0:1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP in the steady state to be
consistent with the data. This value of j implies a ratio of approximately 1.40, which is in line with the
Flow of Funds data.29 I set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1:30 For the LTV,
I selected kSS = 0:9, which is consistent with the evidence that in recent years borrowing-constrained
consumers borrowed on average more than 90% of the value of their house.31 The labor income share of
unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005).32 I selected a value
of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state
markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every
four quarters. The ination persistence parameter  is set to 0.5, as suggested by the approach of Fuhrer
and Moore (1995). For the Taylor rule parameters, I use  = 0:8,  = 0:5 and y = 0:5: The rst value
reects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing.33 The second and third values are consistent with
the original parameter proposed by Taylor in 1993. For , I consider two polar cases for comparison.
In the rst case, the proportion of variable-rate mortgages in the economy is 0, that is, all constrained
consumers in the economy borrow at a xed rate. In the second case, the proportion of variable-rate
mortgages is 1. For the calibration of the standard deviations and persistence of the shocks, I mainly
follow the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The technology shock standard
deviation is set to 1%, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), with 0.9 persistence.34 Monetary policy shocks
are represented by a 0.29% increase in the interest rate on a quarterly basis (as in Iacoviello (2005)).
House price shocks have 0.95 degrees of persistence.35 I set the size of the shock to the housing-demand
parameter at 24.89%, consistent with Iacoviello (2005). The standard deviation of the demand shock is
28Please, see Table A2 in the Appendix where I show this is the case. We see that volatilities barely change for the
variable-rate case and very little for the xed-rate scenario.
29See Table B.101. In this model, consumption is the only component of GDP. To make the ratio comparable with the
data, I multiply it by 0.6, which is approximately what nondurable consumption and services account for in the GDP,
according to the data in the NIPA tables. Alpanda and Zubairy (2014) report values using quarterly GDP.
30Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints these estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
31We can identify constrained consumers as those who borrow more than 80% of their home value. In the US, among
those borrowers, the average LTV exceeded 90% for the period 1973-2006. See the data from the Federal Housing Finance
Board.
32For a robustness check on this parameter, I present Table A3 in the Appendix. Volatilities do not change dramatically
across values, although the volatility of credit increases in the xed-rate case for low and high values of this parameter.
33See McCallum (2001).
34This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2002) estimate a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate it to be
0.93 for the US.
35The persistence of the house price shock is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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set to 1%, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). As in Rabanal (2004) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the
degree of persistence of the demand shock is set to 0.80. Table 1 shows a summary of the parameter
values.
Table 1: Parameter values
 :99 Discount factor for saverse :98 Discount factor for borrowers
j :1 Weight of housing in utility function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
kSS :9 LTV
 :64 Labor share for savers
 0=1 Proportion of variable-rate borrowers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
A :9 Technology persistence
 :8 Interest-rate-smoothing parameter in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination parameter in Taylor rule
2.5.2 Impulse Responses
To gain some insight into the dynamics of the model before studying macroprudential policies, Figure
1 presents impulse responses to a 1 % positive shock to technology with 0.9 degrees of persistence. We
see that the economy responds slightly more strongly after a technology shock when the majority of its
borrowers have a xed-rate mortgage.
In particular, we can see in Figure 1 that a positive technology shock increases output and lowers
prices. As a result, nominal rates decrease. However, for the xed-rate case, ination drives the real
rate and therefore it increases. House prices, which move inversely with the interest rate, increase in the
case of the variable-rate economy but do not increase as much in the xed-rate one. For variable-rate
consumers, the increase in house prices and the decrease in the interest rate make borrowing increase.
Furthermore, because housing is now a more valuable asset, variable-rate borrowers use this borrowing
to increase both housing and consumption goods. However, for xed-rate consumers, the increase in
the real rate together with the fact that house prices are not increasing as much as in the variable-rate
case make borrowing decrease. Fixed-rate borrowers prefer to decrease housing purchases in favor of
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock.
consumption goods and this is why output ends up increasing by slightly more in the xed-rate scenario.
We can see from the dynamics of the model that having variable- or xed-rate mortgages does not
only a¤ect the macroeconomy but also the nancial side. The xed-rate economy has a less powerful
monetary policy tool, but borrowers are more exposed to changes in ination and house prices and thus
this is going to a¤ect credit. Therefore, the structure of mortgage contracts has clear implications, not
only for monetary policy reaction and for macro variables but also for house prices and borrowing. Thus,
it seems clear that when including macroprudential policies, the mortgage contracts that are prevalent
in the economy will a¤ect their implementation, because the macroprudential regulator cares about
nancial stability.
3 Modeling Macroprudential Policies
For the macroprudential policy, I will compare two options. The rst one is a rule on the LTV, so that
this variable responds to credit growth. The second one is an extended Taylor rule so that the interest
rate, apart from responding to ination and output, also responds to credit growth.
The rst case corresponds to a situation in which macroprudential supervision should involve a
regulatory agency, di¤erent from the central bank or within the central bank, that uses a di¤erent
instrument for macroprudential purposes. The second case represents a world in which macroprudential
and monetary policies are integrated and assigned to the central bank, which uses only one instrument,
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the interest rate, to achieve both macroeconomic and nancial stability. In this case, the objectives of
monetary policy should be expanded to include nancial stability.
3.1 LTV Rule
As an approximation to a realistic macroprudential policy, I consider a simple rule for the LTV. In
standard models, the LTV is a xed parameter that is not a¤ected by economic conditions. However,
we can think of regulations of LTVs as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV is high, the
collateral constraint is less tight. Furthermore, because the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow
as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the
loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed simple rules
for the LTV that inversely react to variables such as the growth rates of GDP, credit growth, the credit-
to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules are a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy
could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential simple rule for the LTV,
so that it responds to credit growth:36
kt = kSS (bt=bt 1) 
k
b ; (31)
where kSS is the steady-state value for the LTV. kb  0 measures the response of the LTV to credit
growth. This type of rule would deliver a lower LTV in booms, when credit is growing, therefore
restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom caused by good economic conditions.
3.2 Macroprudential Taylor Rule
Here, I am considering the case in which the central bank adopts a macroprudential approach and
monitors credit variables. Then, I extend the Taylor rule to not only respond to ination and output
growth but also to credit growth.
Rt = (Rt 1)
h

(1+)
t (Yt=Yt 1)
y (bt=bt 1)b R
i1 
"Rt: (32)
36This rule captures the spirit of Basel III regulations on macroprudential policies. According to BCBS (2010), macro-
prudential policies should aim at protecting the economy from periods of excess aggregate credit growth, because they
have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk. Therefore, it recommends national authorities to closely
monitor this variable, i.e., credit growth. The committee also states that other variables such as asset prices or credit
spreads could be useful indicators but are sometimes misleading because they can be a¤ected by other factors not related
to fundamentals.
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Thus, we are giving the central bank a way to implement a macroprudential policy. Note that
increasing the interest rate when credit is growing means restricting credit booms in the economy,
because debt repayments are increasing. Therefore, in this case, the goals of the central bank are
extended to also include nancial stability.
4 Normative Analysis
In this section, I introduce the above mentioned macroprudential policies and study their implications
for welfare and their optimal implementation. In order to do that, rst I present a measure for welfare.
Then, using this measure, I analyze the optimality of monetary and macroprudential policies for both
xed- and variable-rate mortgage economies and present impulse-responses using the optimized values.37
In new Keynesian models with collateral constraints, there are two types of distortions: sticky prices
and credit frictions. Savers prefer policies that alleviate the rst distortion, because they own the rms.
They are better o¤ in a scenario with price stability, the goal of monetary policy. However, borrowers
welfare increases when the credit friction distortion is minimized. Then, borrowers may prefer situations
that generate ination, because in this case, the collateral constraint is relaxed through lower real debt
repayments. On the one hand, monetary policy has e¤ects on the constraint directly through the interest
rate that borrowers have to pay and indirectly through house prices, which makes collateral more or less
valuable. On the other hand, macroprudential policies that deliver higher nancial stability also lower
the negative e¤ects of the credit friction, because they provide borrowers with a scenario in which their
consumption is smoother.
However, these mechanisms di¤er depending on whether the prevalent mortgage contract in the
economy is a xed or variable rate. In the variable-rate scenario, monetary policy is more stabilizing
because there is a direct link between the policy rate and the borrowing rate. Nevertheless, this link
is broken for the xed-rate case. Therefore, an economy with variable rates will be more e¤ective in
minimizing the sticky price distortion, the one that a¤ects savers. In the xed-rate scenario, borrowing
is more dependent on ination and house prices. Although the policy rate does not a¤ect the economy
as much as in the variable-rate case, ination a¤ects real rates and therefore borrowing. The policy
rate also has an e¤ect on house prices, because as for any asset price, house prices move inversely
with the interest rate, and thus also have an e¤ect on credit. Then, borrowers may prefer xed rates
37 I dene the optimal policy as the one that maximizes total welfare.
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because it creates a situation with higher ination and this lowers real debt repayments, thus relaxing
their collateral constraint. Borrowers prefer situations in which the central bank is not able to ght so
e¤ectively against ination, that is, in the xed-rate case. In this case, even though ination can rise or
decrease, it would be in general higher than in a situation in which the central bank has a more powerful
monetary policy tool, that is, in the variable-rate case. This is why, borrowers prefer xed-rate scenarios.
With respect to macroprudential policies, in the variable-rate case, the combination of monetary
policy with an LTV rule would deliver more nancial stability because, in a context of stable ination,
increasing LTVs in times of credit growth means containing credit. However, with xed-rate mortgages,
in which the real borrowing rate basically depends on ination, higher ination variability may o¤set
the e¤ects of increasing the LTV, and greater nancial stability may not be achieved.
When the macroprudential policy is included in the Taylor rule, for the variable-rate case, as other
studies that include credit variables in the monetary policy rule show, there may be little gain in terms of
welfare. However, for the xed-rate case, it creates a new mechanism. Making the nominal rate respond
to an additional variable that is more volatile than ination and output makes house prices react by
more than with the simple Taylor rule. This increases nancial stability through the e¤ect of monetary
policy on house prices.
4.1 Welfare Measure
As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), the two approaches that have been used recently for
welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving
the model by using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for a given policy and
then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I take this latter
approach in order to be able to evaluate the welfare of the borrowers and savers separately and identify
the trade-o¤ that appears between them.38
The individual welfare for savers and the two types of borrowers respectively are dened as follows:
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + j lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
, (33)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + j lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
, (34)
38See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
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Vcf;t  Et
1X
m=0
em
0@lnCcft+m + j lnHcft+m  

Lcft+m


1A . (35)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I dene social welfare as a weighted sum of individual
welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [Vcv;t + (1  )Vcf;t] . (36)
Borrowersand saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ), respectively, so that the two groups
receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
To make the results more intuitive, I present welfare changes in consumption equivalents, taking as
a benchmark the situation in which there are no macroprudential policies.39
4.2 Optimal Policy
In this subsection, I study the mix of macroprudential and monetary policy that maximizes welfare.
In particular, given a grid of possible parameters for the LTV and the Taylor rule (both the standard
and the macroprudential ones), I perform a search that maximizes welfare, subject to the determinacy
requirements.40 Parameters with a star correspond to the optimal ones, the ones that maximize welfare.
I conduct the analysis rst for the benchmark case, in which there are no macroprudential policies, so
that I only optimize over the parameters of the standard Taylor rule. I nd the parameters both for
the variable- and the xed-rate scenarios, as well as for an intermediate case in which the proportion of
mortgages of each type is 50%. The results are presented in Table 2.
39 I follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
40The Taylor principle also holds in the model with collateral constraints; for (1 + )  1, there is indeterminacy.
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Table 2: Optimized Taylor rule (benchmark)
Variable rate  = 0:5 Fixed rate
(1 + ) 16 6:1 1:1
y 8:1 3:6 0
Volatilities
 0:25 0:29 0:52
y 2:12 2:10 2:10
b 1:90 17:53 27:32
The results in Table 2 represent the benchmark case, because they do not include macroprudential
policies. We can see the di¤erence in the optimality of monetary policy in both scenarios: xed versus
variable rates. For the variable-rate case, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond aggressively to
both ination and output. However, for xed rates, because the link between the interest rate and
the macroeconomic variables is weaker, it is not optimal for monetary policy to respond to any of the
variables because in any case, the e¤ect of nominal rates on the economy is very limited; real rates matter
more strongly in this case, and they are driven by ination. Furthermore, the nominal interest rate,
in this case, also a¤ects house prices and this also a¤ects borrowing. In terms of stability, we see from
the volatilities that a degree of greater stability, both macroeconomic and nancial, is achieved with
variable-rate mortgages. Macroeconomic stability is achieved because monetary policy is more e¤ective
with variable rates.41 With xed rates, on the one hand, borrowers are more exposed to changes in
house prices. On the other hand, because the nominal rate is xed, the real rate depends mainly on
ination, and this one is more volatile than in the variable-rate case and real rates are more volatile. All
this generates greater nancial instability. The intermediate case lies in between the two extremes. We
see that the optimal parameters do not imply a policy as aggressive as for the variable-rate case, but
they are stronger than for the xed one. In terms of ination stability, the variable case is the one that
delivers better results even though the variability of output is similar in all three cases.42 The variability
41See Rubio (2011) for a Taylor curve analysis that shows that monetary policy is more e¢ cient with variable-rate
mortgages and therefore the economy is always more stable under this scenario.
42 In models with borrowers and savers, it is usually the case that when one considers two di¤erent scenarios, for aggregate
output di¤erences between them are not very large. By construction, trade-o¤s between borrowers and savers appear and
they o¤set aggregate di¤erences. On the other hand, as also pointed out in Rubio (2011), income e¤ects on the labor
supply decision are an important issue in these kinds of models and they compensate di¤erences between settings. In this
model, the labor supply decision depends on the level of consumption and in response to shocks, the labor supply moves
both because of a substitution and an income e¤ect and this latter one can partly o¤set aggregate di¤erences. In fact, she
experiments in her paper with GHH preferences, which have the property of shutting down the income e¤ect on the labor
supply decision, and nds larger di¤erences between scenarios.
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of borrowing in the mixed case also lies in between the two polar cases.
Table 3: Optimized Taylor and LTV rule
Variable rate  = 0:5 Fixed rate
Taylor rule
(1 + ) 1:9 1:1 1:1
y 0:5 0:1 0
LTV rule
kb 0:8 0:1 0:01
Welfare gain
Savers  0:40  0:99  0:98
Borrowers 0:68 1:43 5:09
Total 0:005  0:005  0:89
Volatilities
 0:28 0:48 0:55
y 2:10 2:09 2:10
b 1:27 10:99 27:35
In Table 3, I present the optimized monetary policy when it interacts with an LTV rule. We see that,
in this case, for the variable-rate scenario, the optimal response for monetary policy is substantially less
aggressive than in the benchmark case without macroprudential policies in place. The macroprudential
LTV rule complements the role of monetary policy,43 and both interacting together manage to achieve a
more stable macroeconomic and nancial scenario. However, this is at the expense of a slightly greater
ination volatility.44 The increase in ination volatility makes savers worse o¤ because they care about
the sticky-price friction. On the contrary, borrowers are better o¤ for two reasons; they like higher
ination because they have to repay their debt, and they prefer a more stable nancial scenario, because
this helps them smooth their consumption.45
43The sense in which macroprudential policy is complementary to monetary policy is that a similar level of ination
volatility is achieved with considerably less aggressive monetary policy. In addition, the volatility of debt is substantially
reduced.
44This is a typical result found in the literature. The results are in line, for example, with Gelain et al. (2013) who
show that while macroprudential policies can stabilize some variables, they can magnify the volatility of others, especially
ination.
45Welfare changes are presented in consumption equivalents, taking as benchmark a situation with no macroprudential
policies. Therefore, a positive value means a welfare gain, that is, the percentage of consumption that the consumer would
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For the intermediate and the xed-rate case, the optimal reaction of both monetary and macropru-
dential policies is smaller then that in the variable-rate scenario. Monetary policy is still not e¤ective,
and therefore the optimal response is minimal, as in the benchmark case. The introduction of the LTV
rule has similar e¤ects to those in the variable-rate scenario. It does not worsen the volatility of output
but it increases the volatility of ination. As remarked by Lustig (2006) and Rubio (2011), the ination
channel that relaxes borrowing constraints should be much more e¤ective when xed-rate mortgages
are predominant, because agents care about real rates. Therefore, agents are more sensitive to changes
in ination in a xed-rate scenario. This is the reason why borrowerswelfare gains and saverslosses
are larger in this case, even though in the aggregate, losses outweigh gains. However, in the xed-rate
case, welfare gains come mainly from the fact that ination is more volatile, but not from the nancial
side. Given that ination is less stable, borrowers benet in terms of debt repayments, relaxing their
constraint. This o¤sets the constraint tightening that the LTV rule should impose. As a result, although
the economy is better o¤, greater nancial stability is not achieved. In the intermediate case, there is
some gain in terms of nancial stability though.
Table 4: Optimized macroprudential Taylor rule
Variable rate  = 0:5 Fixed rate
(1 + ) 13:1 1:1 1:1
y 6 0:1 0
b 0:9 0:1 0:01
Welfare gain
Savers 0:09  0:99  0:99
Borrowers  0:09 1:94 4:47
Total  0:007 0:30 1:77
Volatilities
 0:24 0:63 0:54
y 2:12 2:11 2:11
b 1:93 19:73 20:57
In Table 4, the macroprudential policy is introduced directly in the Taylor rule, by letting the interest
rate respond to credit growth. The results show that, although it is optimal to respond to credit growth,
be willing to pay in order to be in a better situation.
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the optimal monetary policy is aggressive, as in the case in which the central bank only responds to
ination and output. As is common in the literature, for the standard variable-rate case, there are no
welfare gains from responding to credit variables.46 Table 4 shows that ination volatility is slightly
lower than in the benchmark case and nancial instability slightly larger. Thus, with this new optimized
Taylor rule, borrowers are slightly worse o¤ with respect to the case in which credit variables are not
included in the rule because ination is less volatile, although there are no benets from the nancial
side. This is o¤set by the fact that savers live in a slightly more stable world.
However, for the intermediate and the xed-rate cases, the gains are larger, coming mainly from the
borrowersside. When the nominal rate responds to credit growth, it reacts more strongly to changes
in the economy. Even though the optimal response is small, credit is a volatile variable and thus the
interest rate responds more strongly than with the standard Taylor rule. This has an e¤ect on house
prices and the collateral constraint is a¤ected through this channel. For example, if there is an increase
in credit, the interest rate will increase and this will decrease house prices. The fall in house prices
tightens the collateral constraint and helps achieve greater nancial stability. A scenario with greater
nancial stability is benecial for borrowers. This is an example of a theory of second best, given the
distortion that the collateral constraint is introducing.
4.3 Impulse Responses
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses to a technology shock for a variable-rate economy and for
the optimized parameters found in Tables 2-4.47 The technology shock increases output and decreases
ination. As a result, the interest rate increases slightly, to respond to the increase in output, especially in
the case in which the interest rate responds to credit growth. For the case in which the macroprudential
policy is represented by an LTV rule, the interest rate decreases because the optimal reaction parameters
in the Taylor rule are much smaller than in the other two cases. It also reects that relatively more
weight is placed on ination relative to output in this instance. The borrowing interest rate in this
case varies one-for-one with the policy rate. House prices move as a mirror image of the interest rate
and also respond to the increase in housing demand derived from better economic conditions. As house
prices increase, borrowing increases. However, the increase in borrowing is softer in the case in which
46See, for instance, Iacoviello (2005), who shows with a policy frontier analysis that little is gained in terms of ination
and output stabilization by responding to asset prices. Christiano et al. (2014) also nd that consumption falls after a rise
in risk.
47The Appendix contains extra graphs with impulse responses for the other shocks of the model. Impulse responses for
the intermediate case in which  = 0:5 are available upon request.
26
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a technology shock: variable rate.
macroprudential policies are present. When the macroprudential policy is incorporated in the Taylor
rule, the increase in the interest rate is larger and then, borrowing increases by less on impact, although
the e¤ect dissipates in subsequent periods. However, borrowing is really contained when the LTV rule is
active. In this case, as a reaction to credit growth, the macroprudential regulator cuts the LTV, making
credit less accessible for borrowers. For this latter case, the macroprudential measure mitigates the e¤ect
of the technology shock.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to a technology shock for the xed-rate economy, for its
optimized policy parameters. It is also the case that the shock causes output to increase and ination
to decrease. Optimal reaction parameters in the Taylor rule for the xed-rate case make the policy
rate (plotted in the lower left panel) respond only to ination, and in a not too aggressive matter.
Therefore, because ination decreases, nominal interest rates also decrease for the three cases, with the
fall being more persistent when interest rates also react to credit growth. However, given that the link
between the policy rate and the borrowing rate is weaker with xed rates, the real rate, that is negative
ination, is what matters for borrowers. The decrease in ination makes the real rate increase and
therefore borrowing decreases. Although house prices increase, this does not o¤set the increase in the
real interest rate. Furthermore, the increase in house prices is smaller in the case of credit growth being
incorporated into the Taylor rule, creating an extra channel to decrease credit further. As a result, in
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a technology shock: xed rate.
this case, borrowers devote less income to purchasing houses and purchase more consumption goods,
making output increase by more in this scenario. The decrease in credit makes the LTV increase, when
the LTV rule is active and, on impact, credit does not decrease as much, although the e¤ect diminishes
very quickly. Thus, while real rates decrease in the variable-rate scenario, they increase in the xed-rate
one, making borrowing and LTVs (for the LTV rule case) move in opposite directions.
For the sake of completeness, I have also presented in the Appendix impulse responses for an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock and for a house price shock and a demand shock (Figures A1-A6),
both for the variable and xed-rate scenarios. Responses to house price shocks are also worth it to be
discussed, since moderation of house prices is something relevant for macroprudential policy. For the
variable-rate case, house prices increase for the benchmark and for the scenarios with macroprudential
policies. However, with the LTV rule, the increase is more mitigated because the LTV is cut. This
makes borrowing not to increase as much because of the wealth e¤ect as in the benchmark case. With
the macroprudential Taylor rule, the interest rate increases by more than in the other cases and this also
makes borrowing not to increase as much as in the benchmark and makes output decrease. With xed
rates there is less di¤erence between the benchmark and the case in which the macroprudential policy
is introduced. With the LTV rule also borrowing is mitigated with respect to the benchmark but by
less than in the variable-rate scenario. The response of the macroprudential Taylor rule does not cause
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much di¤erence in this case with respect to the benchmark.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I studied the ability of monetary policy to a¤ect nancial markets under both xed- and
variable-rate mortgages. I have developed a new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing
and collateral constraints to analyze the combined e¤ects of macroprudential and monetary policies
with these two types of mortgage contracts. There are unconstrained and constrained individuals who
correspond to the savers and borrowers of the economy. I explicitly introduced xed- and variable-rate
mortgages, that is, constrained individuals are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and
those who borrow at a xed rate.
First, in order to gain some insight, I studied the dynamics of the model for the case in which there
are no macroprudential policies. The results show that having variable- or xed-rate mortgages not
only a¤ects the macroeconomy but also the nancial side of the economy. Therefore, the structure of
mortgage contracts has clear implications, not only for monetary policy reaction and for macro variables,
but also for the implementation of macroprudential policies.
I proposed two types of macroprudential policies. The rst one is a simple rule on the LTV. In this
case, the LTV would be the instrument of the macroprudential regulator, responding to credit growth.
The second one is a Taylor rule for the interest rate, in which rates would respond not only to ination
and output but also to credit growth. In this second case, both monetary and macroprudential policies
would be implemented with a single instrument; the interest rate.
From a normative perspective, I analyzed how the optimality of monetary and macroprudential
policies changes when rates in the economy are either variable or xed. First, I performed the analysis
for the benchmark case, the one that does not include macroprudential policies. For the variable-rate
scenario, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond aggressively against both ination and output.
However, for xed rates, because the link between the interest rate and the macroeconomic variables
is weaker, it is not optimal for monetary policy to respond strongly to any of the variables. Greater
stability, both macroeconomic and nancial, is achieved with variable-rate mortgages. Second, I studied
the optimality of monetary policy interacting with the LTV rule. For variable rates, the optimal response
for monetary policy is substantially less aggressive. The macroprudential LTV rule complements the role
of monetary policy and interacting both together achieves a more stable macroeconomic and nancial
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environment. For the xed-rate case, the optimal reaction of both monetary and macroprudential policies
is smaller than that in the variable-rate scenario. Welfare gains, however, come mainly from the fact that
ination is more volatile but not from the nancial side. Finally, I studied the welfare and optimality
implications of including credit growth directly in the Taylor rule for the interest rate. For the standard
variable-rate case, the welfare gains of responding to credit variables are very small. Albeit, for the
xed-rate case gains are larger, coming mainly from the borrowers side because this delivers greater
nancial stability.
In conclusion, macroprudential policies are welfare enhancing regardless of the mortgage structure
prevalent in the economy. Nevertheless, when mortgages are variable rate, an LTV rule combined with
monetary policy is preferable to including credit variables in the interest-rate rule. When rates are xed,
using the interest rate as an instrument, to stabilize both the macroeconomy and nancial markets,
delivers higher welfare and stability than having two separate instruments. Thus, interestingly, with
xed rates, even though monetary policy is less e¤ective in stabilizing the macroeconomy, it seems a
good tool with which to stabilize nancial markets.
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Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table A1: Predominant Type of Mortgage Interest Rate
Australia Variable Italy Mixed
Austria Fixed Japan Mixed
France Fixed Spain Variable
Germany Fixed United Kingdom Variable
Greece Variable United States Fixed
Source: ECB (2003), IMF
Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis to di¤erent values of 
Variable rate Fixed rate
 0:95 0:96 0:97 0:98 0:95 0:96 0:97 0:98
Volatilities
 0:27 0:27 0:26 0:26 0:22 0:21 0:21 0:20
y 2:25 2:25 2:24 2:24 2:37 2:36 2:35 2:33
b 5:41 5:55 5:71 5:87 11:75 12:04 12:34 12:63
Table A3: Sensitivity Analysis to di¤erent values of 
Variable rate Fixed rate
 0:2 0:5 0:64 0:9 0:2 0:5 0:64 0:9
Volatilities
 0:27 0:21 0:26 0:33 0:35 0:18 0:20 0:29
y 2:56 2:29 2:24 2:19 2:41 2:33 2:33 2:26
b 5:19 5:78 5:87 5:97 14:43 10:58 12:63 17:87
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Figure A1: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock. Variable Rates.
Figure A2: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock. Fixed Rates.
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Figure A3: Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock. Variable Rates.
Figure A4: Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock. Fixed Rates.
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Figure A5: Impulse Responses to a Demand Shock. Variable Rates.
Figure A6: Impulse Responses to a Demand Shock. Fixed Rates.
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Model Derivations
Steady-State Relationships
Using (9) in the steady state we obtain R = 1=. From (5) and (6) we have that R

= R = R = 1=.
From the rst order conditions for housing we can obtain the steady-state consumption-to-housing
ratio for both constrained and unconstrained consumers:
Cu
qHu
=
1
j
(1  ) ; (37)
Cc
qHc
=
1
j

1  e   kSS    e = 1
j
; (38)
where  

1  e   kSS    e. From (19) and (27)we obtain the constrained and unconstrained
consumption-to-output ratio in the steady state:
Cc
Y
=
1  
X


+ jkSS (1  )

; (39)
Cu
Y
= 1  C
c
Y
; (40)
where X = "= ("  1)
The housing-to-output ratio for constrained and unconstrained consumers:
qHc
Y
=
(1  ) j
X

1
 + jkSS (1  )

; (41)
qHu
Y
=
Xj ( + jkSS (1  ))  j (1  ) 
X ( + jkSS (1  )) (1  ) : (42)
Log-Linearized Model
The model can be reduced to the following linearized system in which all lower-case variables with a hat
denote percent changes from the steady state and steady-state levels are denoted by dropping the time
index:
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Financial intermediary br = (1  ) E
1X
i=+1
i bri 1; (43)
brt = brt 1 ) brt = br = 0: (44)
Equation (43) is the log-linearized xed interest rate in each period  . Using this result we can obtain the
log-linearized aggregate xed interest rate, which is zero in deviations from the steady state (equation
(44)), given the initial condition of being at the steady state in the absence of shocks.
Aggregate Demand
byt = Cu
Y
bcut + CcY bcct ; (45)
bcut = Etbcut+1   (brt   Etbt+1) + vt; (46)
bcct = + jkSS (1  )

(byt   bxt)  j

bhct   bhct 1
+
kSSj


bbct  bbct 1  kSSj (brt 1   bt) + vt; (47)
bbct = bkt + Etbqt+1 + bhct   (brt   Etbt+1) : (48)
Equation (45) is the log-linearized goods market clearing condition. Equation (46) is the Euler equation
for unconstrained consumption. Equation (47) is the budget constraint for constrained individuals, which
determines constrained consumption. Equation (48) is the log-linearized collateral constraint. vt is a
demand shock reecting exogenous changes to demand such as scal policy or changes in tastes.
Housing Equations
Hu
Y
bhut + HcY bhct = 0; (49)
bhut = 11   (bcut   bqt)  1  Et  bcut+1   bqt+1 ; (50)
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bhct = 1  kSS bcct   1bqt   kSS h(brt   Etbt+1)  bkti+ ebqt+1   e (1  kSS) Etbcct+1   ekSS bkt: (51)
Equation (49) is the log-linearized market clearing condition for housing. Equation (50) is the hous-
ing margin for unconstrained consumers. Equation (51) is the analogous expression for constrained
consumers.
Aggregate Supply
byt =   1
   1 (bcut + (1  )bcct + bxt) ; (52)
bt = (1  )Etbt+1 + bt 1   ekbxt + ut: (53)
Equation (52) is the production function combined with labor market clearing. Equation (53) is the
New Keynesian Phillips curve with a lagged ination term, where ek  (1  ) (1  ) = and ut is a
normally distributed cost-push shock.
Monetary Policy
brt = brt 1+ (1  ) [(1 + ) bt + y (byt   byt 1)] + et: (54)
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